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1  Introduction 
 
In recent years an objective of many governments has been to improve public service 
efficiency.  In particular, the current UK government has been driving the 
modernisation of the public sector.  One method of achieving improved efficiency is 
through the introduction of financial incentives into the public sector, and this is now 
being implemented in the UK.  However this policy initiative may be thought a little 
premature as it precedes much evidence of success or failure. A consensus from the 
theory
1 on incentives in organisations suggests that high-powered incentives may be a 
bad idea in the public sector context. However, a number of recent surveys have noted 
that the advance of theory has far outstripped the available evidence: see for example 
Prendergast (1999), Burgess and Ratto (2003) and Dixit (2002).  This paper begins to 
fill the gap.  We evaluate the pilot programme of financial incentives in a large UK 
public agency. 
 
The agency, Jobcentre Plus, is one of the main government agencies facing the public; 
its role is to place the unemployed into jobs and administer benefits.  In April 2002, a 
team-based financial incentive scheme was piloted in Britain
2, and we present some 
preliminary findings from an evaluation.  We investigate whether the incentive 
scheme induced any change in the behaviour of workers in Jobcentre Plus and if so 
the mechanisms by which this was achieved.  Did the team-based nature of the 
scheme improve morale or encourage free riding?  The design of the incentive scheme 
incorporated a threshold, hence creating the potential for gaming.  We also examine 
how workers respond to an explicitly multi-tasking environment – did effort focus 
upon the achievement of one target at the expense of another?  Finally the relative 
task measurement and precision has implications for behaviour, as workers may 
choose to exert effort on the tasks for which their actions are more easily verifiable.  
The complex nature of the incentive scheme raises many issues for which theory 
makes predictions.  We test these predictions against the data.  The paper will 
progress as follows.  Section 2 sketches the structure of Jobcentre Plus.  Section 3 
describes the incentive scheme operating within Jobcentre Plus, highlighting features 
particular to the scheme which are related to economic theory in section 4.   The data 
                                                 
1 Dixit (2002).   2
is discussed in section 5, the model in section 6, and the results in 7. Section 8 
contains our plans to extend this prelimianry research and section 9 some initial 
conclusions. 
 
2  Structure of Jobcentre Plus 
 
In recent years there has been substantial change in the organisational structure of 
Jobcentre Plus.  Jobcentre Plus has now replaced the functions of two agencies: the 
Benefits Agency and the Employment Service.  In June 2001 these two agencies 
became part of the Department for Work and Pensions in order to bring together their 
work.  Further reorganisation followed which led to the redefinition of 90 Jobcentre 
districts (there were previously 126 districts).  Conventional methods of delivering 
services changed and in October 2001 Jobcentre Plus was launched.  Initially the 
change meant that 17 of the 90 districts became Pathfinder Districts, within which 
new Pathfinder Offices were created.  In all 56 Pathfinder Offices were formed to 
offer an integrated service; combining the work of the original social security offices 
and jobcentres.  Simultaneously, in April 2002 there was full replacement of the 
Benefits Agency and the Employment Service with Jobcentre Plus, the introduction of 
new PSA targets and the initiation of the pilot Makinson scheme within the 17 
Pathfinder Districts.  The pilot scheme ran for one year, during which time new 
Jobcentre Plus Offices were gradually introduced into the Pathfinder Districts.  By 
2006, new Jobcentre Plus Offices will operate in all 90 districts.  Further structural 
change in September 2002 replaced the existing triangular hierarchical structure with 
a more decentralised organisation, whereby the Head and Regional offices make 
decisions and the districts are more operative. 
 
The role of Jobcentre Plus is to help place people into jobs, to advise on training and 
to administer benefits.  Britain is divided into 11 Jobcentre Plus Regions, within 
which are the 90 Districts; 17 are the Pathfinder Districts in which there is at least one 
Pathfinder office and 73 districts where we have Jobcentre offices (ex-ES) and Social 
Security offices (ex-BA).  In total, there are approximately 1300 offices and 60,000 
members of staff in Jobcentre Plus.   
                                                                                                                                            
2 This followed the recommendations of a report commissioned by the Public Sector Productivity 
Panel, Makinson  (2000).   3
 
3  The Incentive Scheme in Jobcentre Plus 
 
3.1  The Makinson Approach 
The team-based incentive scheme designed for Jobcentre Plus is part of a programme 
to improve efficiency and productivity in the public sector.  The idea of piloting such 
a scheme in public sector agencies dates back to the Makinson report (2000).  The 
report emphasised the appropriateness of team-based rewards for public servants.  
Rewarding individuals based upon team performance fulfils the public sector criteria 
of stressing collective rather than individual achievement, encouraging competition 
not within offices but between offices.  Furthermore, there are concerns that 
individual performance measures may reflect biases against women, ethnic minorities 
and part-time workers: concerns that are alleviated through implementing a team-
based reward structure. 
According to the Makinson report, the incentive payments should be funded largely 
from improved productivity and should represent at least 5% of base salary for all 
staff.  To ensure that the i ncentives reinforce the strategic objectives of the 
organisation, the incentives should relate to targets already embodied in the Public 
Service Agreements (PSA) of the respective agencies.  The Makinson report 
recommends that five targets should be the maximum for junior grades and eight 
targets the limit for more senior staff.  With this in mind the incentive scheme for 
Jobcentre Plus was drawn up. 
 
3.2  Jobcentre Plus Team-Based Incentive Scheme 
The Jobcentre Plus team-based incentive scheme is rather complex and raises many 
questions for which theory makes predictions.  This section explains the features of 
the scheme and then the following section links current theory on public sector 
incentive schemes to Jobcentre Plus. 
 
3.2.1  Team-Based 
17 out of 90 districts are the Pathfinder Districts, representing the teams.  Operating 
within each of these are between 1 and 12 Pathfinder Offices and other Jobcentre Plus 
offices carrying out ex-ES and ex-BA duties.  The number of offices within the team 
varies between 17 and 30 and the total number of people within a team varies between   4
500 and 2000.  If a team successfully meets its target, every member of staff, in all 
offices within the team, receives the bonus. It is the district manager’s responsibility 
to hit the Makinson targets. 
 
3.2.2  Multiple Targets 
The targets set to the Pathfinder Districts are the same as the annual Jobcentre Plus 
targets which apply to all 90 districts.  However for Pathfinder Districts there is an 
additional ‘stretch’ to achieve.  There are five Makinson targets: Job Entry, Customer 
Service, Employer Outcome, Business Delivery and Monetary Value of Fraud and 
Error; they are briefly described below.   
Job Entry 
This is based on a points system, which varies with the priority of the client.  The 
higher the priority of the client, the more points are earned.  Altogether there are five 
different points categories covering the range of Jobcentre Plus clients.  For example, 
the placement of a jobless lone parent attracts 12 points, compared to 2 points for an 
unemployed non-claimant.  Details are given in Appendix 1. 
 
There are additional scores for  
•  Job entries in disadvantaged areas, defined on the basis of a high proportion of 
ethnic minorities or the poorest labour market status and low income (2 
additional points), and  
•  Every Jobseekers Allowance client who remains off benefit 4 weeks after 
starting a job (1 additional point) 
 
Pathfinder districts were grouped into two bands (A and B), based on the percentage 
of Pathfinder offices in the district.  Band A contains up to 20% of Pathfinder offices 
and were allocated a stretch factor of 5%.  Band B have more than 21% of Pathfinder 
offices and were allocated an extra 7.5% of the target. 
As the job entry target measures the amount of work done by  Jobcentre Plus 
employees, it is our proxy for quantity produced.   5
Customer Service 
This target measures performance in meeting the standards and commitments in the 
Jobcentre Plus Customers’ Charter and the Employers’ Charter.  Customer service is 
measured under four headings: 
•  Speed  - How quickly staff answer the telephone, greet a customer, deal with 
customers on the telephone and face to face 
•  Accuracy - The accuracy of information staff give on the telephone and face to 
face 
•  Proactivity - How well staff understand customers’ requests, anticipate their needs 
and how successfully the services are tailored to meet their individual needs 
•  Environment - The quality of the premises, facilities, and their accessibility and 
physical condition. 
 
The target is divided in two key areas: service to clients and service to employers.  
Service to clients is measured against all four elements of Speed, Accuracy, 
Proactivity and Environment as all are included in the Customer Charter.  For service 
to employers, the Environment element is not measured because relatively few 
employers visit the offices. 
The table below shows the proportion of the total Customer Service target allocated 
for each of the four service elements for both clients and employers. 
 
Service Element  Clients  Employers 
Speed  25%  33.3% 
Accuracy  25%  33.3% 
Proactivity  25%  33.3% 
Environment  25%  Not applied to employers 
 
Information on performance against this target is collected by independent research 
companies.   
 
For the client service component, performance is measured via a mystery shopping 
approach.  This consists of a quarterly programme, where the assessors use a variety 
of techniques to measure all the single elements of the target.  In particular, they go 
into Jobcentres Plus Offices, acting out the r ole of a customer (a Scenario Visit).  
Assessors also go into Jobcentre, Social Security Offices and Jobcentre Plus Offices,   6
to assess the environment in which services are delivered (Environmental 
Assessment).  Mystery shoppers telephone Jobcentres, Social Security Offices, and 
Jobcentre Plus Offices, to see how quickly they answer the telephone and how well 
they answer a given scenario (Telephone Timing, Telephone Scenario).   
For the employer measure, another independent contractor is responsible for 
measuring the single elements.  This is done through a survey, in the form of an 
employer telephone questionnaire. 
The service to clients’ elements count for 75% of the customer service target and the 
service to employers counts for the remaining 25%. 
 
Performance against the Customer Service target is used to proxy the quality with 
which Jobcentre Plus employees perform. 
Employer Outcome 
This is monitored as part of customer service.  It measures: 
•  Resolution: if the vacancy was filled  
•  Response: if the vacancy was filled in a time scale that met the employers’ 
needs  
The former element constitutes 75% of the target and the latter element constitutes 
25% of the target. 
 
Information on performance is collected by an independent research company who 
telephones a random sample of employers notifying vacancies to Jobcentre Plus.   7
Business Delivery 
This measures performance in 5 key Jobcentre Plus processes. 
Key Process  What is Measured  How it is Measured 
Income Support (IS) 
Accuracy 
Processing of IS claims is 
compliant with accuracy 
requirements and standards 
Full claims check of a sample 
of cases by specialist teams. 
Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) 
Accuracy 
Processing of JSA claims is 
compliant with accuracy 
requirements and standards 
(including Jobseeker’s 
Agreements)  
Full claims check of a sample 
of cases by specialist teams. 
Labour Market Interventions  Booking of advisory 
interviews, including the 
mandatory New Deals.  
Action to follow up failure to 
attend Jobcentre Plus 
mandatory interviews or 
employer interviews 
complies with timeliness 
requirements 
Sample of cases reviewed 
regionally by Jobcentre Plus 
checkers.  Performance 
measured using a graduated 
system of points scores. 
Incapacity Benefit medical 
Testing 
Decisions made following a 
medical testing intervention 
to comply with evidence and 
timeless requirements 
Cases assessed for timeliness 
requirements through IT 
system, which produces 
monthly data.  Accuracy of 
medical test decisions 
measured by a sample of 
claim checks by specialist 
teams. 
Basic Skills Screening 
(identify people in certain 
client groups who have 
literacy, language and 
numeracy skill needs) 
Long-term JSA claimants 
and participants in the 
voluntary New Deals are 
screened for literacy, 
language and numeracy skill 
needs in accordance with 
specified requirements 
Cases checked through the 
Labour Market System 
 
Performance in each of the 5 Business Delivery target categories is measured against 
a single national target, expressed as a percentage.  Performance is measured by 
taking an average of the results for all the 5 categories, each contributing 20% to the 
overall score. 
   8
Monetary Value of Fraud and Error. 
This is to reduce the money lost in Income Support and Jobseeker’s Allowance 
payments caused by  
•  mistakes made by customers 
•  mistakes made by staff 
•  customer fraud 
The Benefits Agency has had this target since 1998.  The long-term aim is to reduce 
overall losses by 25% by 2004 and by 50% by 2006. 
Two specialist teams measure MVFE.  They visit each district 3 times a year.  The 6 
largest districts are treated as 2 districts for this purpose and are visited 6 times a year.  
During each visit the teams examine a specified number of randomly selected 
sampled IS and JSA cases.  For this target all 17 Pathfinder districts are grouped 
together. 
 
3.2.3  Threshold Nature 
Each of the five targets carries a 1% bonus for each team member, calculated on their 
basic salary.  The District must hit at least two targets to get any bonus and if all five 
are reached there is an extra reward equal to 2.5% of basic salary. 
 
3.2.4  Measured at different levels of the hierarchy 
Although reward for achievement of the Makinson targets is at the District level, the 
targets are measured at different hierarchical levels and in different periods.  The job 
entry targets are recorded for each office on a monthly basis.  The Customer Service 
and Employer Outcome targets are both measured at the district level and are recorded 
quarterly.  Outcomes for the five elements of the Business Delivery target are also 
measured at district level.  The timing for which the outcomes are recorded varies for 
the different elements.  Interim figures for two out of the five elements are measured 
monthly and the other three elements are recorded every four months. For the purpose 
of the Monetary Value of Fraud and Error target, a ‘virtual region’ defines all 17 
Pathfinder Districts and performance against the target is measured annually. 
 
   9
4  Theoretical Issues relating to the design of the incentive scheme  
 
The design of an optimal incentive scheme is a complex matter. The nature of the 
organisation, the size of the team, the measurability of output, the multidimensionality 
and the nature of tasks are all elements to be considered in the design of team-based 
incentives and in any evaluation of a scheme. In what follows we consider the 
implications, as suggested by the economic theory, of the way the scheme has been 
designed at Jobcentre Plus.  
 
Teams very broadly defined 
The definition of a Makinson team is very broad, including all offices within a given 
district, and being formed by up to 2000 people. The team is simply created by the 
reward system, whereby individual rewards depend upon the performance of the 
whole district.  There is no production function identifying the team: whilst staff 
interact  within offices, there is little need for interactions between team members 
located in different offices and carrying out their tasks independently. Such a broad 
definition of teams makes it hard for team members to identify with their teams.  
There are likely to be consequences, in the form of a significant free rider problem.  
Holmstrom (1982) provides one of the seminal contributions to the theory of 
incentives in teams and shows that a negative externality can be created in an 
environment in which output is fully shared among team members.  The intuition is 
that in such a setting, when an agent decreases her contribution, the value of total 
output will decrease and the sum of all agents’ shares will decrease. Hence the agent 
who cheats will not pay in full for the consequences of her act. The cost of one 
person’s shirking (in terms of the share of lower joint output) will be passed onto 
others. The private marginal cost of shirking will be less than the social marginal cost 
(borne by all members of the team) and the level of effort chosen by the individual 
will be lower than the Pareto efficient level. This free-rider problem becomes more 
difficult to tackle the greater the uncertainty in output measurement and the greater 
the size of the team.    10
In the case of a team as defined for Jobcentre Plus the free-rider problem might be 
quite substantial given the difficulty for each team member to easily identify their 
personal contribution to the output of the team.  Moreover, we expect to observe a 
weaker impact from the Makinson scheme as the team size increases. 
 
Multi-tasking 
Jobcentre Plus is a complex organisation and staff are required to deliver a range of 
outcomes. Economic theory suggests that this has an important impact on the 
incentive scheme.  In particular, if the different performance measures are substitutes, 
the use of high powered incentive schemes may have undesirable effects upon overall 
performance. Exerting more effort on one task increases the marginal cost of any task 
that is a substitute and agents may focus their efforts upon one or a few tasks to the 
neglect of others. In this case each outcome cannot be rewarded in isolation and the 
principal should use lower incentives (Holmström and Milgrom, 1990, 1991).  
 
An interesting case related to this situation is when activities are substitutes from the 
perspective of the agents (more time spent on one activity means less time on others), 
but they are complements from the perspective of the principal (the principal wants 
high performance in all of them). Hence the agent is willing to devote more time to 
the less difficult activities, whereas the principal prefers him to devote time to all 
activities. This situation is analysed by Marx and MacDonald (2001). They show that, 
if the principal is unsure about the agent’s preferences over tasks, setting rewards on 
success on individual tasks may be suboptimal in that it may induce workers to focus 
and specialise in the less costly tasks.  
 
The targets set for JCP concern tasks which are related to each o ther. Good 
performance in the Customer Service target may have spillover effects on the 
Employer Outcome and the Job Entry targets; as understanding well the customers’ 
requests, meeting their individual needs and giving them accurate information (the 
proactivity and accuracy elements of the Customer Service target) may speed up the 
process of filling vacancies (the response element of the Employer Outcome target), 
and facilitate the creation of job entries. So for these targets, more effort on one task 
means greater performance also in another task. In contrast, more time spent on 
income support or jobseekers’ claims leaves less time to be devoted to the creation of   11
job entries: hence there is a possibility of negative interdependencies between the 
Business Delivery target and the Monetary Value of Fraud and Error target and the 
remaining three targets: Job Entry, Employer Outcomes and Customer Service targets. 
 
Another important aspect to be considered in a multi-tasking situation is how the 
different dimensions of output can be measured. The prediction of the standard 
models on moral hazard when output is measured with error is that low powered 
incentive schemes should be used when the different outcomes are measured with 
different errors. If each outcome could be rewarded in isolation, then the optimal 
incentive scheme would set higher incentives on the more easily measurable outcomes 
- as they provide a more accurate indicator of the effort exerted by the agent. 
However, in a context where there are multiple dimensions of output, this would make 
the agent concentrate on the tasks which are more accurately measured. Therefore the 
principal has to weaken the incentives on the more accurately measured tasks.  
 
As mentioned above, the Makinson scheme measures p erformance against five 
targets; which combine different elements of observation.  Some of the targets relate 
to outputs that are very difficult to measure.  For example outcomes of the Customer 
Service and Employer Outcome targets rely upon surveys and a  mystery shopping 
approach and the Business Delivery target is measured by random samples.  
Performance against these is measured at district level, so that the contribution of a 
single office towards these targets may not be easily distinguished and the precision of 
measurement may be quite poor.  The measurement of the Monetary Value of Fraud 
and Error target is even more difficult as there is only one measure for all teams 
participating in the Makinson scheme. Consequently we might expect to see a 
possible allocation of effort in unintended directions, more focussed on those 
activities which are most easily measured and for which the individual contribution to 
aggregate output is clearer. In particular we expect to see a focus of effort upon the 
target with the largest sample size: the Job Entry target. 
 
Non-linear reward scheme 
Each of the five targets carries a 1% bonus.  So equal weight is attached to all five 
targets for bonus payment purposes.  At least two targets must be reached to get any 
bonus, and if all 5 are reached there is an extra 2.5% of basic salary.  Given the   12
difficulty of relating one’s effort to measured performance, and given that team 
bonuses are paid whenever two targets are hit, we can expect to observe gaming.  
Offices may focus their attention on a few targets in particular rather than aiming for 
full success of hitting all five targets.  Additional performance beyond the target will 
not be compensated, therefore workers will rationally aim to just hit the target, not 
achieving any more of less than the target level of output. 
 
Measures of performance at one level and rewards at another 
Effort on job entries is undertaken and measured at office level.  But the bonus relates 
to the targets set at district level.  If targets are hit at district level, all offices in that 
district will get the bonus.  If some offices do not hit their targets but at district level 
they are met, they still get the bonus.  This may lead to free riding behaviour. 
 
In summary, applying economic theory to the  incentives scheme designed for 
Jobcentre Plus, we expect to find an effect of team size on effort and output (free 
riding), an effect of differential measurement precision on effort and output and 
‘bunching’ of outputs around the threshold. 
 
5  Data 
Before describing the data available to address the above issues, we clarify some 
definitions. The offices within the districts which are participating in the pilot 
incentive scheme will be referred to as Makinson offices and offices within the 
remaining non-participating districts non-Makinson offices.  The Makinson offices, 
for which the services of ex-ES and ex-BA duties have been integrated are classified 
as Pathfinder offices. The remaining Makinson offices are non-Pathfinder offices.  
The teams identified in the incentive scheme, the Pathfinder Districts, will be referred 
to as Makinson districts.  
 
For the evaluation we interpret administrative data from Jobcentre Plus.  Management 
information data records performance against the five targets and personnel d ata 
provides detailed information on staff.  We were provided with the postcodes for 
every Jobcentre office in Britain, enabling us to merge information on external labour   13
market status from NOMIS
3 and information on public and private sector wages in 
Britain from the Labour Force Survey.  Using this data we derive the production 
function for Jobcentre Plus as follows.  Outputs are measured by the quantity 
produced by workers and the quality of production.  Job entry points achieved for 
each office on a monthly basis are the measure of quantity and the Customer Service 
and Business Delivery targets proxy quality.  The quality outcomes are reported for 
each district on a quarterly basis.  There are two inputs in the production function.  
This is a predominantly human capital intensive organisation, hence data on the 
number of staff for each grade within the offices is one input, recorded monthly.  We 
use two classifications of staff: the total number of staff and a ‘narrow’ definition of 
staff, which simply adds staff from two grades, Administrative Officer (AO) and 
Executive Officer (EO).  The number of staff in these two grades are highly correlated 
with each other (there are roughly one EO to two AOs) and it would therefore induce 
a high degree of multicollinearity to include the numbers of staff in each grade.  Also 
the Makinson scheme incentivises actions which are carried out on the front line, and 
so it makes sense to focus on lower grade staff performing these duties.  The second 
input in the production function is the Pathfinder status of offices.  On the one hand 
Pathfinder offices have the potential to improve productivity of the workers, as they 
underwent refurbishment and new technology was installed.  Hence we could expect 
an increase in output for offices with Pathfinder status.  However, the Pathfinder 
offices were also subject to restructuring in which the managers had to oversee the 
convergence of ex-ES and ex-BA offices.  It is estimated that Pathfinder offices took 
at least five months to adjust to the roll out during which time the performance 
decreased.  The Pathfinder offices were created by October 2001, therefore by the 
start of the incentive scheme in April 2002 the process of readjustment should have 
been completed.  Nonetheless we should expect stronger effects from the incentive 
scheme to appear later on.  Indeed, it is worth noting that although Jobcentre Plus 
employees were informed about incentive scheme in April 2002, they did not know 
the targets until June 2002.   
One complicating  feature in the present context is that the main output of Jobcentre 
Plus – job entries – is dependent to quite a strong degree on outside factors.  The 
strength of the local labour market has been shown to matter a great deal in 
influencing flows out of unemployment, and so it seems likely that it will affect job 
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entries.  We measure this in the following way.  Using the postcode of the Jobcentre 
Plus office, we locate it in a Travel To Work Area (TTWA98).  We then extract 
claimant inflow and vacancy inflow data from NOMIS for each TTWA and for each 
month.  We use the inflow data rather than the stock data, as the stock data will be 
endogenous for the efficiency of the office.  The inflow partly represents the task 
facing the office, and partly is a good proxy for the stock.  It could be argued that the 
inflow itself will be endogenous – an efficient office encourages more vacancies to be 
advertised in it – but we believe this is likely to be second order.  In any case, we 
repeat our analysis with just the claimant inflow.  The labour market status 
information was available at a monthly level and related to travel to work areas 
(TTWA98), which we matched to the individual offices using office postcodes. 
 
This evaluation is preliminary as to date we have received full administrative data for 
the period covering April 2002 -December 2002.  Data for the final quarter of the 
pilot incentive scheme and indeed for the following year, April 2003 - March 2004 
will become available and we will extend the analysis.  So although we do not have 
access to historical data for Jobcentre Plus to be able to implement a standard 
difference-in-difference approach to evaluation , we will be able to adopt a 
“backwards” difference-in-difference approach. 
 
  
6  Model 
 
Jobcentre Plus has a multi-level set up which we will exploit in future analysis.  For 
now, our approach is based on economic models of production where staff can apply 
more of less effort to raise output.  The incentive scheme is meant to raise effort and 
so output.  Economists have modelled precisely the sort of threshold schemes used in 
Jobcentre Plus.  So output will depend on the number of people working, on the 
equipment, and their effort.  The latter is unobservable to us, but is assumed to depend 
on the presence of the incentive scheme.  This is the hypothesis we test here: after 
controlling for as many other factors as we can observe, any remaining difference 
between the scheme and non-scheme districts is due to the effects of the incentive 
scheme itself.  We undertake this analysis in two stages.  First we run the following 
regression over the whole period to isolate an office average effect.     15
 
( ) ot t ot ot d o d o odt Z ßX M PFS y u d a g p m + + + + + + D + =      (1) 
 
where y is total job entry points (tjep), X is a staff variable, and Z is a labour market 
variable.  We allow for an office effect m, a district effect D, and effects from PFS –  
Pathfinder office status – and M –  Makinson district status.  Finally, d  is set of a time 
dummy, and n is random noise.  The key parameter of interest is g – the effect on 
output of the Makinson incentive scheme. 
Note that given the current data setup, a fixed effects regression on (1) above will 
identify a, b, d, and fo where: 
d o d o o M PFS g p m f + + D + ”            (2) 
 
That is, we cannot separately identify the parameter g.. This is because as yet we do 
not have any time series variation in Makinson status; that is, we do not have a 
difference-in-difference set up. Note that office mean size and office mean labour 
market conditions will also be captured in  fo.  So we run (1) as a fixed effect 
regression on all offices with some job entry points. This yields a distribution of 
estimated fo values, one for each office.  
 
For the second stage, we use the calculated average for each office and compare the 
distribution of fo across offices included and excluded from the Makinson incentive 
scheme.  The office averages capture information necessary to understand the 
mechanisms which may drive the incentive scheme to succeed or to fail.  They depend 
upon the average size of the office (staff), the average labour market conditions, 
Pathfinder office status, Makinson district status and other unobservable 
characteristics of the office.  It is therefore necessary to adjust for the first three of 
these before we an attempt to isolate the Makinson effect.  However it must be noted 
that without either a clear random assignment of districts to Makinson status, or a 
proper difference-in-difference set up, any effects might be attributable to correlation 
of the unobservable characteristics of the office and Makinson status: characteristics 
driving efficient outcomes may also be correlated with Makinson status.  
Alternatively if districts with more challenging labour markets were more likely to be 
included in the pilot scheme, then we will underestimate any effect of the scheme.    16
There are other techniques that we can bring to bear on this problem given more time, 
propensity matching for example, as well as utilising a difference-in-difference 
approach as the next year of data becomes available. 
 
7  Results 
The reduced form model evaluates the impact, if any of the scheme on outputs, 
bearing in mind issues relating to teams and multi-tasking.  We look first at quantity 
outcomes (job entries) and then quality. 
 
7.1  Quantity 
The number of Job Entry points achieved by each office is our measure of output.   
We evaluate whether the Makinson team-based incentive scheme induced a change in 
behaviour which resulted in an increase in output.  Tables 1 to 4 report the first stage 
regression results.  In table 1 and 3 OLS regression analysis identifies the variation of 
job entry points over offices and over time.  The Fixed Effect regression analysis 
results show the variation in job entry points over time and are reported in table 2 and 
4.  The second stage analysis then isolates the office level impact upon job entry 
outcomes.  The dynamics of the office level effects are explored in tables 5 to 10 and 
the true Makinson effect is calculated. 
 
7.1.1  First stage 
The dependent variable for tables 1-4 is the log total job entry points.  As economic 
theory suggests no obvious way of modelling the labour market conditions and the 
relationship between job entry points and staff, we allow the data to influence our 
results.  Firstly table 1 and 2 look at various ways of modelling labour market 
conditions.  Our two labour market variables are claimant inflows and vacancy 
inflows. The claimant inflow data is available for the whole evaluation period and 
measures both the “raw material” of Jobcentres (so might be expected to positively 
influence job entries) but are also a proxy for the state of the local labour market (and 
hence would have a negative impact).   The vacancy inflow data is available only 
from June 2002, hence two months of evaluation period is lost from the start of the 
scheme, however as noted above these months were before the workers were fully 
announced to the staff.   Vacancy inflows represent a partial measure of jobs available   17
to secure a job entry and will therefore have a positive effect.   If we want to 
normalise the flows to principally capture time series variation, we can use local 
(TTWA) population, but this data is only available for England and Wales.  So the 
columns are not directly comparable as they are estimated on slightly different 
datasets.   
We find significant effects of the local labour market on job entries.  In all cases, 
vacancy inflows take the expected positive sign.  The sign on claimant inflows varies 
between specifications, but in the fixed effect regressions is always negative  – 
reflecting a worsening labour market.   We show below that the office average effect 
of claimant inflows is positive, which is intuitive as the long run average is a measure 
of the amount of inflow JCP staff have to work with.  The OLS regressions combine  
both effects and so are positive in some columns in table 1.  In column 4 we adopt a 
specification that takes the log ratio of vacancy inflows to claimant inflows.  This 
normalises the variables without restricting the sample to England and Wales, has 
support from the literature on matching functions, is accepted by our data and is the 
specification adopted for the analysis.  Our results show that a worsening labour 
market makes it harder to secure job entries.  This in turn makes it harder for staff to 
achieve their targets and earn bonuses.  The size and significance of the effect shows 
the risk factor that staff bear is non-trivial.   
 
Turning to the staff data in table 3 and 4, as noted above, we take as our staff measure 
the sum of the number of EOs and AOs in the office, staff-in-post and casuals.  This is 
highly correlated with any other sensible measure of staff, so we are confident that it 
captures the true labour power available to office managers.  For functional form, we 
tried a simple linear model, a quadratic model and a log linear model.   
Almost all of the variation in staff is across offices and very little over time within an 
office.  Therefore we expect the coefficients to be very different between the OLS and 
the fixed effect estimation, and the tables bear this out.  We find a very strong effect 
of staff in the OLS, but very little in the panel analysis because it is simply absorbed 
by the fixed effect.   The specification in column 3 of table 4 (or column 4 in table 2) 
is adopted for our evaluation, hence the regressions explain around half of the overall 
variation in job entries.   It is worth noting that there are strong seasonal effects for 
job entry outcomes.      18
We extract the estimated office effects, and subject these to analysis.  Note that these 
necessarily have mean zero, but we adjust them by adding back the grand mean to 
ensure they have the same mean as the equivalent raw data.   
 
7.1.2  Second stage 
The office effects are average office job entry points after allowing for differences 
across offices in staff, local labour market conditions and seasonal effects.  Table 5 
shows the mean and dispersion of these effects and figure 1 gives the full distribution.  
The figure shows some large outliers at the left tail of the distribution, but otherwise 
the pattern is reasonably normal.  The table also shows some preliminary 
unconditional comparisons across different office and district types.   Figures 2 to 4 
present the whole distributions for these comparisons.   Comparing offices in non-
Makinson districts with non-Pathfinder offices in Makinson districts is close to a like-
with-like comparison, and we see that the offices effects are fairly similar in the two 
types of district, with the former being slightly higher.   Pathfinder offices are clearly 
associated with lower mean job entry figures.  However the median and 3
rd quartile of 
Pathfinder offices achieve the highest job entries, evidence that although on average 
the Pathfinder offices underachieve, those that perform well, outperform all other 
offices. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of Office Fixed Effects (Adjusted mean log TJEP) – by Pathfinder Office Status 
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Figure 4: .. Distribution of Office Fixed Effects (Adjusted mean log TJEP) – by Pathfinder and Makinson Status  
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Table 6 takes things a little further.  Splitting the sample by office size and labour 
market conditions we present data means again for a comparison of Pathfinder Office 
and Makinson district status.  We see that for small offices non-Pathfinder Makinson 
offices perform similarly to non-Makinson offices while for larger offices, the non-
Makinson offices do better.  There appears to be little difference by labour market 
conditions.  However, these comparisons do not allow for other factors so we turn to 
regression analysis of these office averages to unravel the effect of different factors. 
Before that, note the differences between the characteristics of offices in Makinson 
and non-Makinson districts.  Table 7 shows that offices in Makinson districts are 
slightly bigger, less likely to be a District (“HQ”) office, have marginally worse 
labour market conditions and are slightly more numerous per district. 
 
Our main regression results are presented in tables 8 and 9.  We start with basic 
explanatory factors in column 1 of table 8.  Big offices (defined in terms of staff) 
produce more job entries; offices in labour markets with a lot of claimant inflows on 
average produce more job entries (note that the labour market variable is vacancy 
inflows/claimant inflows so a negative sign on the variable means a positive 
relationship with job entries).  These are both as expected.  Offices having the status 
of a District Office yield more job entries holding all else constant.  A Pathfinder 
office produces significantly fewer job entries than an otherwise equivalent office
4.   
The key variables we are interested in are the Makinson variables.  Column 2 shows 
that being in an incentivised district has an insignificant effect on job entries.   
However, after allowing for heterogeneity of response by including an interaction of 
Makinson status and office size (column 3), we find a significant Makinson effect.  
Makinson has a positive effect that declines with office size.  This effect fits our 
predictions from the economic analysis presented above.  Our interpretation is that 
bigger offices face a greater free-rider problem and so the incentive payment is less 
effective in eliciting higher effort.  In column 4 we add a variable that measures the  
number of offices in the district
5, and allow its effect to differ in Makinson and non-
Makinson districts.  It has no effect in the latter and a negative effect in the former.  
This also has an interesting interpretation.  It suggests that there is little interaction 
                                                 
4 This is presumably because staff in these offices are performing benefits-related activities as well as 
job entry tasks; it may also reflect the transitional disruption to the new status. 
5 These are offices with positive job entries – not all JCP offices.   21
between offices in non-incentivised districts, but that it is attempted in incentivised 
districts.   The interaction is however far less effective in districts with many offices.  
We examine whether the number of high grade staff in the office has any independent 
effect but it appears not to.  Finally using regional data from LFS, column 6 indicates 
an adverse job entry effect from a private-public wage premium.  The intuition is that 
private sector wages in affluent areas are higher than in less affluent areas.  For public 
sector wages, the same is true but the difference will be smaller.  Therefore it is likely 
that in the affluent areas, high ability workers will be seduced by higher wages into 
the private sector and a high private-public wage premium represents lower skilled 
staff in public sector jobs.  Deleting insignificant variables, w e end up with the 
preferred specification in column 7.  This regression explains about half of the 
variation between offices, and shows significant and heterogeneous effects from the 
incentive scheme. 
 
Inclusion of vacancy inflow as our choice of labour market variable could lead the 
labour market variable to be endogenous.  To ensure this is not the case we conduct 
the above regressions on the fixed effect using just claimant inflow.  The results, 
detailed in Appendix 2 show no major change, either in the magnitude or significance 
of the variables upon the office fixed effect.  
 
7.1.3  Size of Office 
The different effects of the scheme by size are interesting and important to the design 
of the scheme.  We therefore pursue them in a little more detail.  Column 1 of table 9 
breaks the effect up into different office size bands.  We find that the effect of the 
scheme does not decline monotonically with size, but the impact is roughly constant 
until about 60 members of staff (this is AOs + EOs).   In columns 3 to 4 we aim to 
identify the cut-off point at which the costs from free riding exceed benefits from a 
team-based incentive scheme.   We tried cut-off points of 40 and 50 members of staff, 
but the data prefer a cut-off of 60 staff.  We present our final preferred specification in 
column 6.  This implies that the incentive scheme has an effect in offices up to size 
60, and no effect thereafter.  The Makinson effect declines with the number of offices 
in a district.  These results are reinforced by figure 5, which plots the Makinson effect 
for various numbers of staff per office against the number of offices per district.   It is 
clear not only that the Makinson effect is decreasing in the number of offices per   22
district, but that this negative effect has far greater magnitude for large offices.   To 
get some feel for the importance of this, note that of the offices in the final regression, 
847 out of the 942 are below 60, and 70% of staff (as measured by AO+EO measure) 
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7.1.4  Size of Team 
Across teams, or districts, the number of offices and staff varies substantively and it is 
therefore interesting to evaluate the Makinson effect for various team sizes.   The 
number of offices within Makinson districts varies between 6 to 25, so we include an 
interaction of Makinson status and the number of offices, divided into groups 
accordingly.   Column 1 of table 10 reports that relative to small districts (6-10 
offices) large offices have lower job entries, although the results are not statistically 
significant.   The cut-off point is approximately 21 offices.   Figure 6 shows that 
although the Makinson effect is positive for districts with 11 or 18 offices per district, 
it is always negative for districts with 21 offices.  Similarly, the number of staff per 
team affects the performance against the Job Entry target.  The results in column 2 
shows that, relative to small districts (defines as less than 364 staff members) large 
districts have negative job entry points and in column 3 we see that any district   23
smaller than 771 staff will have greater output, relative to the larger offices.  
Therefore for small teams, the incentive mechanism encouraging an increase in output 
has stronger effects than the free rider problem.  However as the team increases in 
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We can use these estimates to calculate the expected gain from the incentive scheme.   
We compute the percentage gain for each district (for offices with less than 60) as: 
100*((exp(0.308 – 0.014*#)-1)), where # represents the number of offices in that 
district, and the coefficients 0.308 and 0.014 (this is 0.019 for Makinson  districts 
minus 0.005 for non-Makinson districts) are taken from column 3 of table 9.   This 
produces a conservative estimate and will if anything understate the effect, compared 
to column 6.   The results of this are in table 11.   Districts with few offices show a 
substantial gain.   We expect that the districts with 15 or fewer offices per district to 
achieve their stretch targets; the others may struggle to do so, because of having more 
large offices, and many offices per district. 
   24
It needs to be re-emphasised that these estimates are only unbiased if the original 
assignment of Makinson status to districts was random.   To the extent that that is not 
true, we may simply be picking up the effect of another characteristic that raises job 
entry performance and is correlated with the assignment process. 
 
7.1.5  Performance relative to the targets 
We can analyse how the targets set during the year relate to job entry patterns, but 
only for the Yorkshire and Humberside region where we have data on targets at 
monthly level.   Calderdale and Kirklees is the only Makinson district within 
Yorkshire and Humberside and we analyse how performance in this district compares 
to performance of the other nine districts in the region.  In particular we analyse the 
difference between actual performance and the target set. 
Figure 7a cumulates the difference between actual performance and targets over time, 
from April 2002 to December 2002.  Whilst Hull consistently performs at the highest 
level and Barnsley and Rotherham the lowest relative to the targets, the performance 
of the Makinson district is average.   
We then focus on the Calderdale and Kirklees district, selecting the three job entry 
client groups which this district was concentrating on and compare the change in 
behaviour over time with the other districts.  The purpose of this analysis is to gauge 
whether there is any difference in the behaviour of the Makinson district over time, 
with regard to its ability to hit the Job Entry target compared to the non- Makinson 
districts.  The highest number of job entries were achieved for the Non Claimant, 
Short Term Unemployed and Employed categories.  For clarity, the districts are 
divided into groups which perform similarly and then compared to the Makinson 
district.  
































Figure 7a: Cumulative Total JE Score
Date
 Barnsley & Rotherham  Hull
 Calderdale & Kirklees







7.1.6  Non-Claimants 
Comparing against districts which display most volatility, shown in figure 7b and 7c, 
Calderdale and Kirklees seems better managed as it produces more consistent results: 
the difference between actual performance and the targets moves closely around zero.    
Hull’s behaviour, for example is more erratic in terms of its job entries.  Figure 7d 
shows that the behaviour of Calderdale and Kirklees more closely resembles the 
districts displaying less variation in performance: Leeds, Bradford and Sheffield. 
7.1.7  Short-Term Unemployed 
At first glance there seems to be a tendency for the Makinson district to under-
perform, relative to the target.  However it is also worth noting that, compared to 
Barnsley and Rotherham whose performance wildly fluctuates from one month to 
another, the Makinson district behaves consistently.  In figure 7g the difference 
between actual performance and the targets, whether positive or negative, is lower 
than in the other two figures, and again the performance within Calderdale and 
































Figure 7b: Non Claimants
Date
  S Humberside    Calderdale 
  Wakefield    Hull 





































Figure 7c: Non Claimants
Date
  Barnsley & Rotherham    Calderdale 
  Doncaster    N Yorkshire 



































Figure 7d: Non Claimants
Date
  Bradford    Calderdale 
  Leeds    Sheffield 






































Figure 7e: Short Term Unemployed
Date
  Barnsley & Rotherham    Calderdale 
  Doncaster    N Yorkshire 





































Figure 7f: Short Term Unemployed
Date
  S Humberside    Calderdale 
  Wakefield    Hull 





































Figure 7g: Short Term Unemployed
Date
  Bradford    Calderdale 
  Leeds    Sheffield 
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Figure 7h – 7j: Performance over the year to date, Yorkshire and Humberside: Employed   29
Figure 7b – 7j: Performance over the year to date, Yorkshire and Humberside 
 
 
7.1.8  Employed 
The achievement of Employed job entries relative to the target is close to zero for all 
months in the Makinson district; more so than in other districts.   
 
Comparing actual performance against targets, the district participating in the 
incentive scheme exhibits less volatile performance: actual performance remains close 
to the targets.  This is not surprising giving the threshold nature of the scheme, as 
performance above the level of the target is not rewarded. 
 
7.2  Quality 
 
The Customer Service target measures how well Jobcentres respond to the needs of 
clients and employers using the Jobcentre services and is the first proxy for quality.  
The second measure of quality is the Business Delivery target, which judges 
performance against five Jobcentre Plus processes, incorporating aspects such as 
accuracy and skill screening.  We examine whether workers of the Jobcentres focus 
upon achieving the job entries – quantity - at a cost to quality.   
 
7.2.1  Customer Service 
7.2.1.1   First Stage 
We assume the functional form for the model which most represented the data in the 
job entry analysis; a log linear model.  Columns 1 and 3 of table 12 report the 
coefficients from the OLS regression and columns 2 and 4 the Fixed Effect results.  
We analyse the effect of both district log staff and district log job entries per member 
of staff upon the quality measure.  District staff have a negative effect upon the 
Customer Service outcome, but columns 2 and 4 show that this is absorbed by the 
district effect.  There is evidence that as staff accumulate job entry points, there is a 
decline in the Customer Service outcome, although the results are not significant.  A 
strong labour market (claimant inflows / vacancy inflows) tends to improve the 
Customer Service outcome and again there are noted seasonal effects. 
   30
7.2.1.2   Second Stage 
In table 13 we examine the relationship between variables which are likely to drive 
working behaviour and the district Customer Service fixed effect.  Paradoxically, staff 
negatively impacts upon the Customer Service outcome.  One reason for this could be 
a lack of clarity of responsibility within the districts.  The proportion of Pathfinder 
offices within Makinson districts, Makinson status and Makinson status interacted 
with staff do not statistically impact upon the Customer Service outcome.  We know 
from above that there is the size of the office is important in determining the effort 
exerted towards achieving the job entry target.  Unfortunately the Customer Service 
target is measured at a district level, thus it is impossible to see whether the outcome 
differs with office characteristics.  However we can control for the number of offices 
within the district, to examine whether small districts outperform larger districts.  It 
appears not to be the case as the variable is statistically insignificant, even when 
interacted with the Makinson status. 
 
7.2.2  Business Delivery 
7.2.2.1   First Stage 
The first stage regressions on log Business Delivery outcome, reported in table 14 
also show a negative effect from staff which disappears once the district fixed effects 
are controlled for.  Across time and districts, job entry points per staff member 
improve the outcome, but looking only across time there is an adverse (insignificant) 
effect.  The log labour market variable does not statistically influence the Business 
Delivery outcome. 
 
7.2.2.2   Second Stage 
Table 15 reports the regression results on the district Business Delivery outcome.  
Identified is a negative impact from staff upon the district Business Delivery score, 
but similarly to the Customer Service outcome no other district level variables are 
significant.  All districts, whether participating in the incentive scheme or not do not 
influence the outcome of the Business Delivery target. 
 
The quality analysis generated results to suggest that the team defined by the district 
does not entice workers to exert effort towards achieving the Customer Service or the 
Business Delivery outcome.  There are several interpretations for why such results   31
were generated.  Firstly, the sample size is restricted to the 90 districts, with so few 
degrees of freedom it is difficult to appropriately define the production function.  
Secondly there may be free rider behaviour within the teams.  The quality outcomes 
are measured at an aggregated level and, as noted above the impact of individual 
effort (whether the individual is the employee or the office) is hard to verify.  In 
contrast there was strong evidence of differential effort contribution towards the job 
entry target, measured at office level. In particular, as already mentioned, in small 
offices and districts, performance on job entries tends to be relatively high. Therefore, 
the fact that the two quality outcomes do not vary with the number of offices per 
district may suggest that workers do not try to improve performance on these targets 
and their motivation is not so strong as for the job entry target – shirking is not easily 
verifiable. Thirdly, multi-tasking issues traditionally emerge when measuring quantity 
and quality, as quality elements are intrinsically measured with greater noise.  This is 
certainly true for the Jobcentre Plus quality measures.  The Customer Service outcome 
is measured by a mystery shopper approach and the five elements of the Business 
Delivery target are recorded at different time periods, making it difficult for the 
workers to understand how to improve their behaviour in such a way that would raise 
the score achieved by the district. Given that all targets carry the same bonus, their 
rational response would be to focus on tasks for which their effort is easily 
transferable into outcomes: i.e. the quantity target. 
 
In summary, we have analysed the effect of the Makinson scheme both on quantity 
and on quality.  We found strong results for the quantity analysis: the Makinson 
scheme has had a significantly positive effect on job entries.  This effect is smaller in 
larger offices, and is smaller in districts with many offices.  There was some evidence 
of districts responding to the threshold nature of the scheme: exerting enough effort to 
ensure that the target was hit, but not higher effort.  The quality analysis was less 
conclusive.  However this is not entirely surprising, as the measures for quality are 
collected at an aggregated level and may not be accurate in measuring the actions of 
employees.  
 
8  Future analysis 
As noted above, this analysis of the team-based incentive scheme is preliminary and 
we intend to advance the evaluation in a number of ways.    32
1.  The time period of observation will be extended to incorporate information for full 
four quarters in which the pilot scheme was run. Beyond that, we will collect and 
use data from subsequent years to undertake a difference-in-difference analysis. 
2.  We will exploit the point system used to measure the job entry target, asking 
whether the employees of Jobcentre Plus give precedence to clients deemed high 
priority over other clients, in order to achieve more points towards the target.  
There is a difficulty, as the workers will only behave in such a manner if the 
reward for placing a high priority client (the points achieved) exceeds the cost of 
doing  so (the difficulty of placing the client into employment).  The method by 
which we do tackle the issue is to estimate the difficulty of placing lone parents 
into employment
6, using data on the number of lone parents actively seeking 
employment at every Jobcentre office.  If the Jobcentre staff do allocate jobs in 
accordance with the design of the incentive scheme, we would expect to have 
higher placements of lone parents, relative to other clients in areas with many lone 
parents actively seeking employment.   
3.  We will use the estimated labour market impact to calibrate the labour market risk 
facing JCP agents. Theory says that this should impact on the design of scheme. 
Put differently, since we know it has not, there ought to be differential reaction to 
the scheme in different labour market conditions. We will investigate this as a test 
of the theory. 
4.  We will use the data to evaluate models of team incentives, the multi-tasking 
aspects, and the potential role of public sector motivation. 
5.  It will be possible t o calculate the number of job entries created through the 
incentive scheme. Thus we can measure the output gained from the pilot scheme. 
Then, once we know the end of year bonus payments we will conduct welfare 
analysis, comparing the cost incurred from the incentive scheme to the cost 
savings, in terms of reduced welfare payments. 
 
9  Conclusion 
 
Although there exists a wealth of economic theory on the implementation of financial 
incentives in public services, our evaluation of the Jobcentre Plus incentive scheme is 
to date the first empirical study in the UK.  The complex nature of the scheme in   33
Jobcentre Plus has allowed us to explore the impact across many dimensions.  Our 
findings are that incentive schemes are more successful in small teams.  We interpret 
this as evidence that the free rider problem is mitigated in small teams by positive 
attributes of team work, such as team morale and peer monitoring, however these 
mechanisms weaken as teams grow in size.  We observed strong, positive effects from 
the incentive scheme upon quantity produced, but no real impact upon quality.  This 
may confirm theoretical predictions of multi-tasking – whereby workers focus their 
effort upon targets measured with greater accuracy (i.e. quantity) and for which the 
outcome of their actions is more easily verifiable.  On the other hand, the finding may 
reflect the small sample size available for quality analysis.  Jobcentre Plus employees 
seem to have responded to the threshold nature of the incentive scheme, exhibiting 
gaming behaviour by aiming to exert effort enough to hit the target set, but not to 
exceed the target.  There are many more issues relating to the Jobcentre Plus incentive 
scheme that we wish to investigate. However from the current analysis, evidence 
suggests that the public sector employees did respond to the incentive scheme and 
therefore with the appropriate design there is potential for improving the efficiency of 





                                                                                                                                            
6  Placement of Lone Parents into employment is rewarded with the maximum of 12 points    34
Table 1 
OLS Regressions using different Labour Market Variable forms 
Dependent variable is Log total job entry points 
 










         
Log Staff  0.660  0.647  0.680  0.698 
  (0.010)**  (0.009)**  (0.011)**  (0.029)** 
Log Normalised Claimant Inflows  0.188  0.247     
  (0.029)**  (0.026)**     
Log Normalised Vacancy Inflows  0.355       
  (0.029)**       
Log Claimant Inflows      -0.093   
      (0.023)**   
Log Vacancy Inflows      0.104   
      (0.025)**   
Log Labour Market        0.082 
        (0.037)* 
         
May 2002    0.109     
    (0.029)**     
June 2002    -0.025     
    (0.029)     
July 2002  0.041  -0.040  -0.015  -0.025 
  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.015) 
August 2002  0.235  0.147  0.169  0.171 
  (0.029)**  (0.029)**  (0.030)**  (0.012)** 
September 2002  0.048  0.064  0.108  0.095 
  (0.029)  (0.030)*  (0.030)**  (0.015)** 
October 2002  0.297  0.289  0.274  0.270 
  (0.029)**  (0.029)**  (0.030)**  (0.017)** 
November 2002  -0.000  0.005  0.057  0.060 
  (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.016)** 
December 2002  -0.498  -0.608  -0.607  -0.621 
  (0.030)**  (0.029)**  (0.030)**  (0.018)** 
         
Constant  6.832  5.365  3.785  3.839 
  (0.207)**  (0.155)**  (0.049)**  (0.092)** 
         
Observations  5636  7257  5636  6469 
R-squared  0.55  0.52  0.53  0.55 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
Note – ‘staff’ means the sum of AOs and EOs in the office.  
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Table 2 
Fixed Effect Regressions using different Labour Market Variable forms 
Dependent variable is Log total job entry points 
 










         
Log Staff  0.112  0.107  0.113  0.096 
  (0.031)**  (0.031)**  (0.038)**  (0.037)** 
Log Normalised Claimant Inflows  -0.322  -0.291     
  (0.033)**  (0.038)**     
Log Claimant Inflows      -0.160   
      (0.046)**   
Log Vacancy Inflows      0.213   
      (0.029)**   
Log Labour Market        0.194 
        (0.019)** 
         
May 2002    0.084     
    (0.013)**     
June 2002    0.044     
    (0.014)**     
July 2002  -0.041  -0.000  -0.002  -0.012 
  (0.011)**  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.012) 
August 2002  0.144  0.185  0.190  0.188 
  (0.010)**  (0.013)**  (0.015)**  (0.012)** 
September 2002  0.129  0.165  0.080  0.070 
  (0.012)**  (0.015)**  (0.014)**  (0.012)** 
October 2002  0.270  0.313  0.276  0.263 
  (0.010)**  (0.013)**  (0.014)**  (0.012)** 
November 2002  0.120  0.156  0.075  0.078 
  (0.013)**  (0.016)**  (0.015)**  (0.012)** 
December 2002  -0.655  -0.611  -0.579  -0.602 
  (0.011)**  (0.013)**  (0.017)**  (0.012)** 
         
Constant  3.901  4.046  5.219  5.679 
  (0.207)**  (0.236)**  (0.475)**  (0.115)** 
         
Observations  7257  7257  5636  6469 
Number of officeid  823  823  822  942 
R-squared  0.50  0.50  0.57  0.57 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
Note – ‘staff’ means the sum of AOs and EOs in the office.    36
Table 3 
OLS Regression with varying staff variables; using chosen labour market variable as 
vac/cf 
Dependent variable is Log total job entry points 
 
  (1) Linear  (2) Quadratic  (3) Log 
       
Labour Market  -6.228  13.696   
  (8.376)  (7.951)   
Staff  9.090  14.957   
  (0.166)**  (0.260)**   
Staff Squared    -0.036   
    (0.001)**   
Log Labour Market      0.082 
      (0.020)** 
Log Staff      0.698 
      (0.009)** 
       
July 2002  -17.874  -14.785  -0.025 
  (16.828)  (15.911)  (0.027) 
August 2002  79.913  83.000  0.171 
  (16.837)**  (15.920)**  (0.027)** 
September 2002  62.106  61.288  0.095 
  (16.782)**  (15.868)**  (0.027)** 
October 2002  192.378  182.450  0.270 
  (17.139)**  (16.209)**  (0.027)** 
November 2002  59.198  52.946  0.060 
  (17.058)**  (16.131)**  (0.027)* 
December 2002  -225.720  -228.969  -0.621 
  (17.109)**  (16.178)**  (0.027)** 
       
Constant  270.588  131.987  3.839 
  (17.515)**  (17.275)**  (0.034)** 
       
Observations  6714  6714  6469 
R-squared  0.36  0.43  0.55 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
Note – ‘staff’ means the sum of AOs and EOs in the office.  
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Table 4 
Fixed Effect Regression with varying staff variables; using chosen labour market 
variable vac/cf 
Dependent variable is Log total job entry points 
 
  (1) Linear  (2) Staff Square  (3) Log 
       
Labour Market  35.353  35.369   
  (7.284)**  (7.284)**   
Staff  -0.707  -0.148   
  (0.565)  (0.824)   
Staff Squared    -0.005   
    (0.005)   
Log Labour Market      0.194 
      (0.019)** 
Log Staff      0.096 
      (0.037)** 
       
July 2002  -10.956  -10.941  -0.012 
  (7.219)  (7.220)  (0.012) 
August 2002  86.655  86.620  0.188 
  (7.235)**  (7.235)**  (0.012)** 
September 2002  56.653  56.591  0.070 
  (7.142)**  (7.142)**  (0.012)** 
October 2002  186.907  186.672  0.263 
  (7.408)**  (7.412)**  (0.012)** 
November 2002  65.201  64.957  0.078 
  (7.281)**  (7.286)**  (0.012)** 
December 2002  -215.995  -216.224  -0.602 
  (7.373)**  (7.377)**  (0.012)** 
       
Constant  504.979  496.231  5.679 
  (20.200)**  (22.273)**  (0.115)** 
       
Observations  6714  6714  6469 
Number of officeid  986  986  942 
R-squared  0.39  0.39  0.57 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
Note – ‘staff’ means the sum of AOs and EOs in the office.  
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Table 5: Describing the Fixed Effects 
 







           
Total  6.002  6.052  5.522  6.525  942 
Pathfinder Offices  5.752  6.073  5.389  6.640  48 
Non-Pathfinder Offices  6.015  6.051  5.522  6.520  894 
Offices in Makinson 
Districts 
5.939  6.042  5.478  6.526  217 
Offices in Non-Makinson 
Districts 
6.021  6.053  5.524  6.524  725 
Non-Pathfinder offices in 
Makinson districts 




Table 6: Breakdown of Fixed Effects 
 
Table 6a: Table of Fixed Effects: Total 
 
    Pathfinder Office  Total 
    Yes  No   
Makinson 
District 










  No  Mean 
Count 






Total      48    894  942 
 
 
Table 6b: Table of Fixed Effects: Small Offices (<25 Staff) 
 
    Pathfinder Office  Total 
    Yes  No   
Makinson 
District 










  No  Mean 
Count 






Total      11    455  466 
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Table 6c: Table of Fixed Effects: Large Offices (>=25 Staff) 
 
    Pathfinder Office  Total 
    Yes  No   
Makinson 
District 










  No  Mean 
Count 






Total      37    439  476 
 
 
Table 6d: Table of Fixed Effects: Good (above average) Labour Market Conditions 
 
    Pathfinder Office  Total 
    Yes  No   
Makinson 
District 










  No  Mean 
Count 






Total      15    347  362 
 
 
Table 6e: Table of Fixed Effects: Poor (below average) Labour Market Conditions 
 
     Pathfinder Office  Total 
    Yes  No   
Makinson 
District 










  No  Mean 
Count 






Total      33    547  580 
 
 Note – ‘staff’ means the sum of AOs and EOs in the office.    40
Table 7: Office characteristics summary by Makinson District Status 
 
    Pathfinder Office 
(%) 
Staff  
(AO + EO) 
Number of 





             
Offices in Non-  Mean  29.47  11.354  0.105  0.189 
Makinson Districts  Median  24  11  0  0.144 
  Sd  26.76  4.061  0.307  0.335 
  Q10  7  6  0  -0.142 
  Q90 
 
57  17  1  0.612 
             
Offices in   Mean  0.221  36.111  14.475  0.065  0.182 
Makinson Districts  Median  0  27  16  0  0.176 
  Sd  0.416  32.727  5.156  0.246  0.26 
  Q10  0  8  7  0  -0.129 
  Q90  1  78  22  0  0.545 
             
All offices  Mean  0.051  31  12.073  0.096  0.187 
  Median  0  25  12  0  0.175 
  Sd  0.22  28.366  4.53  0.294  0.319 
  Q10  0  8  7  0  -0.129 
  Q90  0  61  17  0  0.57 
Note – ‘staff’ means the sum of AOs and EOs in the office.  
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Table 8: Regressions on the Fixed Effects 
Dependent variable is Office Fixed Effect 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
               
Pathfinder Office  -0.697  -0.682  -0.537  -0.582  -0.581  -0.576  -0.576 
  (0.085)**  (0.093)**  (0.105)**  (0.106)**  (0.106)**  (0.106)**  (0.105)** 
District Office  0.251  0.249  0.238  0.234  0.233  0.238  0.239 
  (0.064)**  (0.065)**  (0.064)**  (0.064)**  (0.064)**  (0.064)**  (0.064)** 
log Staff  0.557  0.557  0.586  0.583  0.583  0.589  0.593 
  (0.023)**  (0.023)**  (0.025)**  (0.026)**  (0.026)**  (0.026)**  (0.025)** 
Mean labour market conditions  -0.135  -0.136  -0.131  -0.125  -0.125  -0.139  -0.139 
  (0.039)**  (0.039)**  (0.039)**  (0.038)**  (0.038)**  (0.039)**  (0.039)** 
Makinson District Status  -0.019  0.099  0.432  0.429  0.408  0.467 
    (0.048)  (0.063)  (0.146)**  (0.147)**  (0.147)**  (0.133)** 
Makinson Status*Staff  -0.004  -0.005  -0.005  -0.005  -0.005 
      (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)** 
Number of Offices in District    -0.004  -0.004  -0.004   
        (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)   
Makinson Status*Number of offices  -0.02  -0.02  -0.019  -0.024 
        (0.009)*  (0.009)*  (0.009)**  (0.008)** 
% High grade staff in office      -0.239  -0.254   
          (0.559)  (0.557)   
Private Public Wage Gap            -0.018  -0.018 
            (0.008)*  (0.008)* 
               
Constant  4.459  4.463  4.369  4.421  4.429  4.431  4.356 
  (0.097)**  (0.098)**  (0.103)**  (0.126)**  (0.127)**  (0.127)**  (0.102)** 
               
Observations  942  942  942  942  942  942  942 
R-squared  0.46  0.45  0.46  0.47  0.47  0.47  0.47 
Note – ‘staff’ means the sum of AOs and EOs in the office.  
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level   42
Table 9: Regressions on the Fixed Effects – Alternative Size Variables 
Dependent variable is Office Fixed Effect 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
             
Makinson Office, staff <= 12  0.262  0.333         
  (0.160)  (0.146)*         
Makinson Office, 12 < staff <= 25  0.285  0.351         
  (0.159)  (0.147)*         
Makinson Office, 25 < staff <= 40  0.351  0.413         
  (0.150)*  (0.138)**         
Makinson Office, 40 < staff <= 60  0.293  0.353         
  (0.161)  (0.152)*         
Makinson Office, staff > 60  0.016  0.073  -0.285      -0.292 
  (0.168)  (0.159)  (0.120)*      (0.120)* 
Makinson District Status      0.308  0.282  0.299  0.371 
      (0.137)*  (0.137)*  (0.140)*  (0.124)** 
Makinson Office, staff > 50        -0.181     
        (0.115)     
Makinson Office, staff > 40          -0.124   
          (0.094)   
Number of Offices in District  -0.006    -0.005  -0.006  -0.006   
  (0.005)    (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)   
Makinson Status*Number of offices  -0.018  -0.024  -0.019  -0.017  -0.018  -0.024 
  (0.009)  (0.008)**  (0.009)*  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008)** 
             
Observations  942  942  942  942  942  942 
R-squared  0.46  0.46  0.46  0.46  0.46  0.46 
Note  – also included in the regressions are intercept, Pathfinder Office status, District Office status, log staff, and mean labour market 
conditions; the coefficients not shown but available from the authors. 
Note – ‘staff’ means the sum of AOs and EOs in the office.  
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level   43 
Table 10: Alternative Team Sizes 
Dependent variable is Office Fixed Effect 
  1  2  3 
       
Makinson District, 10 < offices <= 17   0.032     
  (0.144)     
Makinson District, 18 < offices <= 20  -0.249     
  (0.161)     
Makinson District, offices <= 21  -0.243     
  (0.147)     
Makinson District, 364 < staff      0.210 
      (0.079)** 
Makinson District, 365 < staff <= 550    -0.102  0.108 
    (0.081)  (0.107) 
Makinson District, 551 < staff <= 770    -0.071  0.139 
    (0.081)  (0.106) 
Makinson District, staff <= 771    -0.210   
    (0.079)**   
       
Observations    942  942 
R-squared    0.46  0.46 
Note – also included in the regressions are intercept, Pathfinder Office status, District Office status, log staff, and mean labour market   44
Table 11: Calculating the Gain in Performance 
 
  Number of offices per district   
  0 – 5  6 – 10  11 – 15  16 – 20  21+  Total 
             
% Gain  31.4  22.5  14.2  6.5  0.0   
Number of districts  1  8  2  4  2  17 
Ratio of offices with less than 
60 staff to total offices 
4/5  53/71  25/26  56/72  43/43  181/217 
Average % Stretch  7.5  8.3  6.25  5.0  5.0  6.29 
             
Note: mid-points used to calculate expected gain 
Uses regression results from table 9 column 3 (which understate gain relative to col. 6) 
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Table 12:  OLS and Fixed Effect Regressions 
Dependent Variable is Log Customer Service Outcome 
  1  2  3  4 
         
District Log Staff  -0.012  0.086     
  (0.005)*  (0.057)     
District Log (Job Entries/Staff)      -0.001  -0.001 
      (0.003)  (0.003) 
District Log Labour Market  0.016  0.011  0.021  0.006 
  (0.009)  (0.019)  (0.009)*  (0.020) 
September 2002  -0.022  -0.020  -0.022  -0.023 
  (0.005)**  (0.003)**  (0.005)**  (0.003)** 
December 2002  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  0.000  (0.000)  (0.000) 
         
Constant  -0.180  -0.060  -0.165  -0.161 
  (0.007)**  (0.069)  (0.004)**  (0.005)** 
         
Observations  180  180  174  174 
Number of districtid    90    90 
R-squared  0.17  0.37  0.14  0.39 
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Table 13: Regressions on the Fixed Effect 
Dependent Variable is District CST Fixed Effect 
  1  3  4  5  6  7 
             
District log Staff  -0.097  -0.096  -0.101  -0.102  -0.111  -0.112 
  (0.007)**  (0.007)**  (0.007)**  (0.008)**  (0.010)**  (0.010)** 
District Mean labour market conditions  0.007  0.009  0.008  0.008  0.002  0.002 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Makinson District Status    0.015  0.013  0.013  0.019 
      (0.008)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.021) 
Makinson Status*Staff      0.005  0.001  0.013 
        (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.045) 
Number of Offices in District        0.002  0.002 
          (0.001)  (0.001) 
Makinson Status*Number of offices        -0.001 
            (0.002) 
% PF offices within the district  -0.006  -0.008  -0.008  -0.008  -0.009 
    (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
             
Constant  -0.291  -0.217  -0.209  -0.208  -0.220  -0.222 
  (0.011)**  (0.058)**  (0.058)**  (0.058)**  (0.058)**  (0.058)** 
             
Observations  90  90  90  90  90  90 
R-squared  0.74  0.74  0.75  0.75  0.76  0.76 
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Table 14: OLS and Fixed Effect Regressions 
Dependent Variable is Log Business Delivery Outcome 
  1  2  3  4 
         
District Log Staff  -0.013  0.020     
  (0.006)*  (0.037)     
District Log (Job Entries/Staff)      0.008  -0.002 
      (0.003)  (0.002) 
District Log Labour Market  -0.008  -0.004  0.000  -0003 
  (0.012)  (0.016  (0.011)  (0.016) 
September 2002  0.010  0.006  0.006  0.007 
  (0.010)  (0.005)  (0.010)  (0.005) 
October 2002  0.002  0.006  -0.003  0.007 
  (0.010)  (0.005)  (0.010)  (0.006) 
November 2002  0.012  0.016  0.009  0.017 
  (0.010)  (0.005)**  (0.010)  (0.005)** 
December 2002  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  0.000  (0.000)  (0.000) 
         
Constant  4.488  4.525  4.500  4.500 
  (0.011)**  (0.046)**  (0.009)**  (0.006)** 
         
Observations  287  287  285  285 
Number of districtid    89    89 
R-squared  0.03  0.09  0.04  0.09 
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Table 15: Regressions on the Fixed Effect 
Dependent Variable is District BDT Fixed Effect 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
             
District log Staff  -0.034  -0.033  -0.040  -0.038  -0.044  -0.050 
  (0.012)**  (0.012)**  (0.013)**  (0.015)*  (0.017)*  (0.017)** 
District Mean labour market conditions  -0.016  -0.015  -0.018  -0.018  -0.022  -0.020 
  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Makinson District Status    0.019  0.029  0.029  0.064 
      (0.014)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.038) 
Makinson Status*Staff    -0.023  -0.026  0.041 
        (0.069)  (0.069)  (0.080) 
Number of Offices in District      0.001  0.002 
          (0.001)  (0.002) 
Makinson Status*Number of offices      -0.005 
            (0.003) 
% PF offices within the district  -0.004  -0.005  -0.005  -0.005  -0.006 
    (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
             
Constant  4.479  4.522  4.531  4.528  4.520  4.512 
  (0.021)**  (0.104)**  (0.103)**  (0.105)**  (0.105)**  (0.104)** 
             
Observations  89  89  89  89  89  89 
R-squared  0.08  0.08  0.10  0.10  0.11  0.14 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Job Entry Priority Group Categories 
 
Priority Client Group 1  Job entry points score 12 
Jobless Lone Parents including people on the New Deal for Lone Parents 
Those on the New Deal for Disabled People 
People with Disabilities in receipt of a specified primary benefit 
Other people in receipt of a specified primary benefit 
Priority Client Group 2  Job entry points score 8 
People on the New Deal 50 plus 
People on the New Deal 25 plus 
Those on the New Deal for Young People 
Employment Zones 
Other People with Disabilities not included in Priority Client Group 1 
Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) long term claimants 
Priority Client Group 3  Job entry points score 4 
JSA short term claimants 
Priority Client Group 4  Job entry points score 2 
Unemployed non claimants 
Priority Client Group 5  Job entry points score 1 
Employed People 
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Appendix 2: Regressions on the Fixed Effects using Claimant Inflow as the Labour Market Variable 
Dependent variable is Office Fixed Effect 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
               
Pathfinder Office  -0.719  -0.728  -0.589  -0.650  -0.649  -0.621  -0.618 
  (0.100)**  (0.110)**  (0.125)**  (0.125)**  (0.125)**  (0.124)**  (0.124)** 
District Office  0.186  0.187  0.174  0.172  0.170  0.188  0.191 
  (0.076)*  (0.077)*  (0.077)*  (0.076)*  (0.076)*  (0.076)*  (0.076)* 
log Staff  0.723  0.723  0.752  0.739  0.739  0.727  0.740 
  (0.028)**  (0.028)**  (0.030)**  (0.031)**  (0.031)**  (0.030)**  (0.030)** 
Mean Claimant Inflow  0.034  0.034  0.034  0.034  0.034  0.048  0.048 
  (0.002)**  (0.002)**  (0.002)**  (0.002)**  (0.002)**  (0.004)**  (0.004)** 
Makinson District Status  0.010  0.126  0.386  0.380  0.316  0.514 
    (0.057)  (0.076)  (0.179)*  (0.179)*  (0.178)  (0.161)** 
Makinson Status*Staff  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004 
      (0.002)*  (0.002)*  (0.002)*  (0.002)*  (0.002)* 
Number of Offices in District    -0.014  -0.014  -0.015   
        (0.006)*  (0.006)*  (0.006)*   
Makinson Status*Number of offices  -0.012  -0.011  -0.008  -0.023   52
        (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.008)** 
% High grade staff in office      -0.408  -0.321   
          (0.689)  (0.682)   
Private Public Wage Gap            -0.069  -0.068 
            (0.015)**  (0.015)** 
               
Constant  3.601  3.599  3.513  3.722  3.737  3.703  3.469 
  (0.085)**  (0.086)**  (0.093)**  (0.127)**  (0.130)**  (0.129)**  (0.092)** 
               
Observations  943  943  943  943  943  943  943 
R-squared  0.57  0.57  0.58  0.58  0.58  0.59  0.58 
Note – ‘staff’ means the sum of AOs and EOs in the office.  
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
 
 